ASUS router backdoors affect 9K devices

Here’s a summary of the recent ASUS router security incident, based on the latest reports:
š 1. Incident Overview
- Scope: Approximately 9,000 ASUS Wi-Fi 6 routers (primarily RT-AX55 models) have been compromised by a botnet dubbedĀ “AyySSHush”Ā .
- Persistence: The backdoor survivesĀ firmware updates, reboots, and factory resetsĀ because it is stored in the router’s non-volatile memory (NVRAM)Ā .
- Detection: Cybersecurity firm GreyNoise identified the campaign in March 2025, though attacks were extremely stealthy (only 30 malicious requests detected over three months)Ā .
āļø 2. How the Attack Works
- Initial Access: Attackers use brute-force logins, authentication bypass exploits (some unpatched), and a known command injection vulnerability (CVE-2023-39780) to gain controlĀ .
- Backdoor Setup: Once accessed, attackers:
- Enable SSH on a custom port (TCP/53282).
- Add their public SSH key to the router’sĀ
authorized_keys
Ā file for persistent remote access. - Disable logging and security features (e.g., AiProtection) to evade detectionĀ .
- No Malware: The attack abuses legitimate ASUS router features, leaving no traditional malware tracesĀ .
ā 3. Why Firmware Updates Fail to Remove the Backdoor
- The backdoor is written toĀ NVRAM, which retains configuration data even during firmware upgrades or resets.
- ASUS patched CVE-2023-39780 in recent firmware, but this only preventsĀ newĀ attacks.Ā Existing compromises persist.
š”ļø 4. Recommended Mitigation Steps
If you own an ASUS router (especially RT-AX55):
1ļøā£Ā Update Firmware: Install the latest patch from ASUS to fix known vulnerabilitiesĀ .
2ļøā£Ā Check for Compromise:
- Scan for open SSH portĀ 53282.
- Review theĀ
authorized_keys
Ā file for unrecognized entriesĀ .
3ļøā£Ā Full Factory Reset:Ā RequiredĀ to purge the NVRAM backdoor. After reset, manually reconfigure the routerĀ .
4ļøā£Ā Disable Remote SSH: Unless essential, disable WAN-facing SSH access in router settingsĀ .
5ļøā£Ā Block Malicious IPs: Use firewall rules to block IPs linked to the campaign (identified by GreyNoise)Ā .
Infection StatisticsĀ
Metric | Detail |
---|---|
Confirmed Compromised | ~9,000 routers (as of May 27) |
Primary Targets | Taiwan, U.S. |
Botnet Name | AyySSHush |
š 5. Attribution & Motive
- Suspected actorĀ “ViciousTrap”Ā (potentially China-linked) due to targeting patterns avoiding Chinese devicesĀ .
- Goal: Likely building a botnet for future attacks (e.g., DDoS, proxy networks)Ā .
š Key Insight
This attack highlights critical risks in router security:Ā Even patched devices remain vulnerable if compromisedĀ beforeĀ updates. Proactive checks and resets are essentialānot just firmware updates.
Fromļ¼
https://www.probatteryer.com/
https://www.probatteryer.com/blog/
https://www.batteryer.uk/blog
https://www.batteryer.sg/blog
https://www.batteryer.nz/blog/